



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The German Tribune

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Paris and Bonn agree on the key issues

Paris and Bonn share a basic approach to world problems, even if their ideas on solutions differ. This became clear when President Mitterrand met Chancellor Schmidt in Paris in the 39th Franco-German summit.

Though the meeting dealt with Poland and other world affairs, it mostly involved economic and monetary matters.

President Mitterrand says even more clearly than Chancellor Schmidt that the dollar's exchange-rate variations and the American policy of high interest rates have become an intolerable burden on Europe.

France and Germany had little difficulty agreeing on these points. M. Mitterrand and Herr Schmidt had much in common on others, too.

But their respective domestic positions differ considerably. Oddly enough, the French President, with four Communist Ministers in the Cabinet led by Socialist Premier Pierre Mauroy, has much greater leeway on East-West issues than the German Chancellor.

Asked whether the existence of four Communist Cabinet Ministers in the

longstanding sentimental ties with Poland that date back at least to Napoleonic days.

What is more, M. Mitterrand, again following in General de Gaulle's footsteps, has announced that use must be made of any opportunity to end the partition that has effectively divided Europe since Yalta.

The Franco-German summit dealt mainly with economic and monetary matters. Both countries are keen to reactivate the largely stalled machinery of the Common Market.

But the confidential and crucial part of the consultations will have dealt with events in Warsaw and their interpretation.

France may have come to feel that General Jaruzelski is not just a puppet pulled by strings from the Kremlin. In his own blunt, military manner he may be committed to some kind of Polish nationalism.

But a French Socialist head of state who is steadfastly opposed to General Pinochet in Chile can hardly expect to come to terms with a military regime in Warsaw that has put an end to Polish workers' hopes of freedom.

If General Jaruzelski really is pursuing an independent policy towards the Kremlin, it is argued in Paris, the Polish crisis is not yet over by any stretch of the imagination.

Russian fears for its western flank might yet lead to direct military intervention by the Red Army, in which case the Polish officer corps would have played a pitiful and pretty disgraceful transitional role.

The real difference between the French and German views of world affairs may well be that France is free of the nuclear complex that is proving an increasing burden on the Federal Republic of Germany.

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No matter what, Chopper just won't give up the ghost

French government was in any way detrimental to France's reliability as a Nato ally. M. Mitterrand, grandly answered:

"If that were so, I would not have any Communist Ministers."

It has occasionally been said in Germany that the current Polish crisis has brought M. Mitterrand with a conviction and welcome opportunity of keeping the influence of his Communist allies and rivals down to a minimum and discrediting the French Communist Party among the general public.

But may that be untrue; but it is hardly the point. Where Poland is concerned, France is committed as a matter of principle, ideologically, one might say, to the cause of freedom.

But that is not all. France also has

There are times when no policy can avoid creating the impression of conciliability, though contrasting views may be.

These are the moments when you can hear the clock of history swish through time yet are unable to set eyes on as much as a coat-tail.

You live in a political makeshift, with improvisation in keeping with the general sense of uncertainty and contradictions being accepted for the time being as a defying solution.

But it goes without saying that a policy cannot be maintained in this state for an unlimited period.

When it is overextended a policy of all things to all men creates the impression of lacking a clear direction and any list of feasible targets.

This can become particularly uncomfortable when essential data of political



President Mitterrand and Chancellor Schmidt hold a press conference after their meeting in Paris. (Photo: dpa)

France is now benefiting from the insistence of French leaders from Pierre Mendès-France and Charles de Gaulle to François Mitterrand on a nuclear build-up in both the civil and military sectors.

When M. Mitterrand deals with East-West affairs and Western missile modernisation (which he considers essential), he sounds a note that one could hardly imagine a German statesman echoing.

"Certainly," he says, "we would like to keep up the dialogue as long as possible with major partners, especially the Soviet Union."

"That is why we have said we are in favour of the two superpowers' declared intention of getting down to negotiations in Geneva."

"But we have abandoned none of our principles. We accept nothing that could be detrimental to the balance of military power from the West's point of view."

"That is why I have been opposed to the deployment of Soviet SS-20 missiles all along and am not prepared to countenance the slightest weakness towards the Soviet Union."

M. Mitterrand avoids criticism for being too pro-Atlantic (a criticism that

still carries weight in France) by advocating views on the Third World in general and Latin America in particular that Washington cannot find easy to stomach.

France has been much more insistent than Germany on human rights in El Salvador. It affords resistance groups there de facto recognition and even supplies the Sandinista government of Nicaragua with light arms.

M. Mitterrand says this in the final analysis is in the US interest. Be that as it may, France takes a much more forthright stand in the Third World than Germany; in Africa, say, or Angola.

Here too a French statesman finds it much easier to speak out against the United States than his German counterpart.

At his meeting with M. Mitterrand Herr Schmidt must have been reminded, especially in connection with Europe's ties with America, of a comment by the late Gustav Heinemann.

Dr. Heinemann, who was Bonn head of state in the early 70s, once noted that Germany was a difficult fatherland. Helmut Schmidt must surely feel that it still is.

Peter Scholl-Latour
(Rheinischer Merkur/Christ und Welt, 25 February 1982)

The ABC of policy making

developments have changed but policy does not seem to be responding to them in a common-sense manner.

Arbitrary examples are easily cited. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and developments in Poland, for instance, have surely brought about a fundamental change in East-West ties.

In Afghanistan the Russian intervened militarily in a neighbouring country that was generally accepted to be an intermediate political sector.

The Soviet move was made at a time when the United States showed, in fact, that it in contrast, was prepared to accept national developments that ran counter to US interests.

It was this move that prompted President Carter to reassess Soviet policy.

In Poland the Soviet Union has gone on to show that it is unable to arrive at a rational relationship with the East European countries in its sphere of influence, certainly not one that can be reconciled with their national aims and views.

The Soviet Union nowadays is less able than ever to operate with the argument that a loss of freedom is at least offset by gains in social equality and economic security.

As a result it lacks the means of political integration, which is why it is likely to revert to coercive measures such as military intimidation and martial law.

Significant changes have also occurred at the other end of the political spectrum. Just as it was the coincidence that in Jimmy Carter's Southern was

Continued on page 2

GENEVA TALKS

SPD dissent over Nato decision puts Bonn influence in jeopardy

Speculation about whether the Chancellor, Helmut Schmidt, will resign after the SPD party conference in Munich in April, is growing in both Western European and American media.

The speculation has been fuelled by several regional conferences of the Chancellor's SPD which have passed various resolutions calling into question Nato plans for missile modernisation.

Missile modernisation forms part of the December 1979 Nato decision to deploy new missiles in Europe while offering to negotiate with Russia on intermediate-range nuclear force reduction in Europe.

But Herr Schmidt, when asked if he intended to resign, said he was sorry but he planned to be around for a while yet.

But he would do, wouldn't he? A government that is on its way out no longer has any say in world affairs.

At another point in the same interview the Chancellor added that what went on in political parties was not the same as what went on in governments.

On the strength of the twin-track Nato decision, and after constant urging by the Bonn government, US and Soviet delegations have conferred in Geneva since 30 November 1981 on medium-range missile cuts in Europe.

Their respective initial proposals run totally counter to each other and are aimed at ensuring their respective advantage, but there have been no suggestions yet of these talks being abandoned.

There can be no ruling out the possibility of Soviet threats to scuttle them as a means of exerting influence on the Munich SPD conference and triggering a change of government in Bonn.

But since the alternative would be a coalition of Christian and Free Democrats, any such Soviet ploy would be highly unlikely.

The initial US proposal for the Geneva missile talks, announced by President Reagan in November, owed its existence to the current Bonn coalition of Social and Free Democrats.

It was the zero option (admittedly an American zero option) of all Soviet SS-20 systems being scrapped in return for a US decision not to station Pershing 2 and Cruise missiles in Western Europe.


President Reagan chose to deliberately ignore the fact that the Soviet Union wants to retain part of its SS-20 potential as a deterrent to China or, arguably at some future date, Japan.

But in international horse-trading of this kind the first offer is never entirely straight, and the same goes for the initial Soviet proposal at Geneva.

First, it was based on the assumption that both sides already had roughly 1,000 intermediate-range missile systems deployed, without distinguishing between the number of warheads or between nuclear warheads (which can be shot down) and missiles (which arguably can't).

Second, it included in the East only systems based west of the Urals or beyond the Urals but aimed at targets in Western Europe, conveniently ignoring many of the mobile SS-20s, each with three MIRV warheads and a range of 3,000 km.

Third, it included in the West a total not only all US and British nuclear forces capable of reaching targets in the



Soviet Union from locations in Europe but also French nuclear potential, which does not form part of Nato planning.

Fourth, it included about 65 F-111 US nuclear fighter bombers that are normally stationed in the United States but chose not to include most Soviet medium-range nuclear bombers capable of being transferred to Europe from beyond the Urals in even less time than it would take to fly the US squadrons across the Atlantic.

These figures, incidentally, are all based on the assumption that data supplied by both sides are strictly accurate, which is not necessarily the case.

At all events there are no plausible grounds for taking the Soviet offer, coming as it does, from a closed society without a free peace movement and peace research, at greater face value than the US proposal.

Why, after all, should the Soviet offer be more credible or more selfless? Take

the Russian proposal to reduce INF systems to 600 each by 1985 and to 300 each by 1990.

This would mean by 1990 that Western Europe would probably have to rely on British and French missile systems, with US missiles having been withdrawn completely.

Nato would thus face an entirely new situation and have to draw up a new defence concept appropriate to the new state of affairs.

The draft resolution adopted by the SPD national executive for the Munich conference is aimed at not pulling the carpet from under any part of the West's position at the Geneva talks.

But is the resolution aimed at influencing the further course of negotiations or merely at showing even less sense of reality and underscoring the SPD's peace profile?

By agreeing to negotiate in Geneva the Soviet Union has not only confirmed that Moscow feels threatened by Nato's missile is prepared to negotiate on part of its deterrent potential aimed at Western Europe.

Moratorium proposals by Moscow cannot, no matter how resolutely they

are championed, hide the fact that the idea might have done better to voluntarily defer deployment of SS-20 systems 1980 or 1981.

This would probably have ended the peace movement in Western Europe to score a political victory over modernisation proposals.

The Soviet Union would have no to benefit because Nato's missile modernisation programme cannot be implemented before the end of 1983 in any case.

But by going ahead with deployment the Soviet Union merely showed the aging Kremlin leaders are no longer able to marshal rational tactical arguments against the military-industrial complex.

Yet a straight comparison between US armaments policy under the Carter and Reagan administrations is only to show how widely the influence of military-industrial complex in Western democracies can vary.

After having been so successful in urging Washington and Moscow to hold the Geneva talks in the first place, the Bonn government in its present up may be expected to maintain its influence on the course of negotiations.

Could the same be said of the Bonn government coalition led by other Chancellor? Would either be or willing? It is hard to say, and only much less certain.

Erich Hahn
(General-Anzeiger, 24 February)

The ABC of policy making

Continued from page 1

voted into the White House six years ago, so it is no coincidence that in Ronald Reagan a West Coast man is the present incumbent.

The South and the West of the United States have gained in influence and prosperity at the expense of the once predominant East Coast and North.

This has entailed no mean change in the political world view held by the United States, Washington nowadays feels much more directly confronted by the Soviet Union.

Gone are the days when it was more Eurocentric, Secretary of State Haig is finding it hard to gain understanding in Washington of certain European objections to US policy.

In the long term this trend may mean that the United States will pull back to America, or at least disregard European views.

This will make dealing with the United States more difficult, and riskier for Europe too inasmuch as it will run a risk of accelerating in the United States a development it ought to fear and seek to forestall in the interest of traditional ties between them.

These instances of changes in world affairs are arbitrary; they could be replaced without difficulty and at length by others.

One argument advanced in favour of a policy not of "either/or" but of "both and" is that otherwise one might face a most unpleasant choice.

One might have the choice between detente and confrontation, between unthinking loyalty to the United States and a policy more strongly dictated by European interests, between America and France or between France and Bri-

tain — all being choices one would prefer not to have to make.

But at times such necessities of choice are merely rhetorically exaggerated or stylised as apparent problems. Take, for instance, the German Question.

No-one seems to ask whether, given the political and economic position in the East Bloc, the GDR might not have a natural interest in maintaining orderly relations with the Federal Republic without Bonn being required to pay a price for the mere continuation of existing ties.

Seldom in politics does one really have to make a choice between two evils. The opposite of a policy of "both and" is something entirely different.

It is a policy of framing one's own interests in such a way that they can be jointly pursued with as large as possible a number of partners.

The number of partners need not be the same on every issue. Wherever possible, unpleasant choices must be left to others. The art of the possible does not amount to more.

On one point at least, certainly among governments, there is still a sector in which national and international interests coincide.

Maintaining the balance of military power is still regarded as the basis of any policy, and in principle Europe and the United States are still agreed that a US presence in Europe and a fair share of risks between them are indispensable if the balance is to be maintained.

Last but not least, the Europeans have been able to secure acceptance on this basis of the need for continued arms control talks with the Soviet Union to enable Russia, too, should it so wish, to reduce confrontation and embark on cooperation.

Many sectors nonetheless remain in which differences of opinion can be sporadically bridged.

It looks as though the German in Bonn, at the latest round Franco-German summit talks between Chancellor Schmidt and President Mitterrand in Paris, have tried to arrive at a definition.

Against a background of scanty peace agreement on other issues, German and French leaders seem to have sought to define the points on which they feel cooperation with the West States to be indispensable.

By the same token they sought to define the issues on which they felt differences ought to be voiced within the West. Whatever one may feel on individual issues this could prove a step in the direction of greater clarity.

But a shadow is cast over the Bonn from Bonn, where it is impossible to see with any certainty whether the Federal government, beset by domestic weakness, will be able to summon a reign policy energy.

Paris too is unsure whether Helmut Schmidt is either willing or able to stay in office until 1984.

(Der Tagesspiegel, 28 February)

The German Tribune

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HOME AFFAIRS

A time of reckoning for the coalition



Helmut Schmidt, the Foreign Minister and Free Democrat leader in Bonn has always relished the idea of being responsible for a turning point in post-war German politics.

His chance may be near. In the circumstances, that turning point could only mean switching sides and joining forces with the Christian Democrats. They were in coalition together up until 1966.

A minority in both coalition parties in Bonn, Chancellor Schmidt's Social Democrats and the FDP, is keen to end the alliance.

Some seem hell-bent on ending the coalition at all cost.

Helmut Schmidt may be able to understand some Social Democrats feeling that after sharing power in Bonn since 1966 the SPD could do with a spell in opposition to regenerate. But he can be excused for being hopping mad that Social Democrats who hold this view seriously also believe that once the SPD no longer has to heed the views of its coalition partner, the FDP, Social Democratic policies will be uniform and as pure as the driven snow.

They are equally wrong in imagining that SPD policies will then wield a magic spell on voters. Without the Chancellor the Social Democrats cannot hope to poll more than about the 30 per cent that kept them in opposition throughout the 50s.

Understandably, this prospect horrifies the SPD majority, who attach greater importance to staying in power than to taking a stand on specific issues and are prepared to accept coalition compromises as the price they have to pay for governing.

A consensus between these two views no longer exists, as Herr Genscher well knows, which is why he is so keen on a change that can, in the circumstances, only mean joining forces with the Christian Democrats.

The Freiburg manifesto, framed and adopted in the early 70s, has clearly been forgotten, and the achievements of the SPD-FDP coalition since 1969, backed to the hilt by Herr Genscher throughout, are history.

Was most of what was accomplished (or worse still, envisaged) wrong? This is something many Free Democrats are wondering, and not just those who, like the FDP leader, seem hell-bent on ending a 12-partnership in power.

This too is something he knows only too well, which is why he is continually impressing on party members and potential voters the need for change.

He can only risk a change of allegiance provided the Free Democrats switch sides to a man, but the left-wing Liberals led by William Borm see no reason why they should do anything of the kind.

They feel what Herr Genscher seems to have in mind would be a sin against the Freiburg manifesto, which is why Herr Borm in Berlin is so incensed.

Free Democrats committed to a coalition with the SPD have gained unexpected support from the party's Baden-Württemberg region, which has recently advocated a nuclear-free zone.

This can hardly be to Herr Genscher's liking. It shows that for the time being at least his membership will not stay with him through thick and thin regardless which way the much-vaunted turning-point may lead.

Yet the FDP leader is still determined to risk the step taken by his predecessor Walter Scheel, who in 1969 led the Free Democrats of his day across the floor to join the SPD.

To be able to state a good case for crossing the floor again he needs to be in a position to argue that the Social Democrats are unable to reach a consensus, are critical of coalition decisions and would like to shirk responsibility for unpopular resolutions.

The Social Democratic minority mentioned early is less easy to pinpoint geographically but is giving the FDP leader sterling service.

He owes it to them that he is never at a loss for a fresh argument. Sooner or later, he reckons, these arguments will be enough to persuade the last doubting Free Democrat that it is his constitutional duty to make the break.

Convincing the parliamentary party and rank-and-file members is not enough, FDP voters must likewise be won over, otherwise the change will have been to no avail.

The FDP certainly needs to be particularly careful about its image. It must not give any grounds for suspicion of wanting to balance the budget solely by means of welfare cuts.

That is why the Free Democrats are now setting their cap at the ordinary working man for whom they have done precious little in either the budget cuts or the job creation package.

A congress to be held in Essen in March will be the first the FDP has ever devoted to the ordinary working men and women who make up an estimated 70 per cent of party members.

The Free Democrats have always lacked a clear policy on the working man that could be effectively converted into votes.

The Essen congress has been convened to remedy this state of affairs, and the timing is excellent. Mid-term state assembly elections are to be held in four Länder this year and the FDP must naturally be seen to be concerned about the working environment.

The Free Democrats are to try their hand in a policy sector that in the past has been largely left to the Social and Christian Democrats.

Their aim is to ensure that when the turning-point comes and the FDP forges fresh coalition links not too many will look askance.

The SPD, which is entirely taken up by its internal squabbles, can only look on helplessly. It has no reserves on which to call to help redress the balance.


It has forfeited too much prestige to be able to regain its former renown merely by recourse to a few cosmetic touches.

Helmut Bauer
(Nürnberger Nachrichten, 23 February 1982)



Franz Josef Strauss, the Bavarian CSU Premier, accuses the SPD of dismantling the welfare state. He was speaking to an audience of 7,000 in Passau, Bavaria. (Photo: dpa)

CSU Strauss-for-Chancellor plans give CDU a shock



Plans have been drawn up to persuade Franz Josef Strauss to run for the Chancellorship again, says the leader of the CSU group in the Bundestag, Friedrich Zimmermann.

Herr Strauss, the Bavarian Premier and CSU leader, stood unsuccessfully against Helmut Schmidt in 1980.

It may be too early for public discussion about who will lead the Opposition. However there is wide dissatisfaction with Herr Helmut Kohl, the CDU leader.

This was one reason why Herr Zimmermann has acted. CSU leaders have long had pent-up dissatisfaction with the way to Opposition in Bonn is run.

His statement shocked leading Christian Democrats and caused dismay at the CDU head office in Bonn.

Some observers in the capital were even inclined to see the whole thing as a Mardi Gras joke from Munich.

Herr Zimmermann said that from autumn next year Herr Strauss would be in the running again as a CDU/CSU candidate for Chancellor.

It is clear that beneath a veneer of demonstrative CDU/CSU unity a process of fermentation is under way again.

The selection of the Opposition candidate has been deferred as the two parties agree to disagree in the meantime.

The internal difficulties of the Opposition parties have merely been cloaked by the FDP/SPD disputes.

For the first time in a long time, the coalition parties have been over the past months been taking the headlines away from the CDU and CSU.

Many CDU/CSU members of the Bundestag frankly admit that they can count themselves lucky the SPD and FDP have stolen this particular show.

Many, especially CSU men, of course, are critical of Herr Kohl in their own ranks, saying he is not attacking the disintegrating SPD/FDP coalition with sufficient punch.

This, they say, he has to do in order to accelerate the decline of the Social and Free Democratic coalition in the eyes of the electorate.

Herr Kohl is said not always to make best use of the ruling coalition's weak points. Some Opposition critics would go even further.

They claim the Free Democrats are reluctant to break with the Social Democrats once and for all solely because they have no confidence in Herr Kohl's political leadership.

That may be why Dr Zimmermann has given Herr Kohl one last period of grace. Either the current Bonn government falls this autumn or it will stay in power until 1984, he argues.

If the government falls ahead of time Helmut Kohl will be the man to lead the CDU/CSU to power. Otherwise the running will be open to all from autumn 1983.

The choice will then probably be between four candidates: Herr Kohl, Herr Strauss, Gerhard Stoltenberg and Ernst Albrecht.

Stoltenberg has best selection chance

Schleswig-Holstein Premier Stoltenberg seems at present to stand the best chance of selection. His popularity is on the increase and he is reputed to be the first choice of the Free Democrats in Bonn as junior partners in a coalition with the CDU/CSU.

Herr Strauss could quit the running without losing face whenever he chose to do so. He has said more than once that he would not stand in the way of a coalition with the FDP if they objected to him.

Dr Stoltenberg, who has said he would leave Kiel and go to Bonn if the need arose, is held in high esteem by the CSU leader, unlike the present CDU leader.

Herr Strauss values highly both his political qualities and his know-how.

Einar Koch
(Hamburger Abendblatt, 23 February 1982)

■ MIGRANTS

Fear that Turkish treaty with EEC will lead to huge influx

There are 1,560,095 Turks in the Federal Republic of Germany, or one foreign resident in three, and Bonn is worried the floodgates will open in 1986.

By the terms of Turkey's treaty of association with the EEC, Turkish citizens are to enjoy freedom to live and work in the Common Market countries in four years' time.

The national executive of the Social Democratic Party, the party of Willy Brandt and Helmut Schmidt, has decided that the terms of the agreement must be amended to rule out the proposed freedom of residence.

Peter Glotz, the SPD's Bonn business manager, read out the executive's resolution with a note of determination, but what the Social Democrats have in mind is easier said than done.

The association agreement is a multi-lateral treaty and Turkey is not alone in being far from keen on what Bonn would like to see happen.

The other nine member-countries of the EEC all feel there are more urgent matters to be considered than a renegotiation of the agreement with Turkey.

Bonn's problem dates back to the early 60s. On 12 September 1963 the Six, as they then were, signed an association agreement with Turkey that came into force on 1 December 1964.

Association, a status falling short of full Common Market membership, was to be implemented in three steps over up to 22 years.

Article 12 of the agreement laid down the provision that now upsets Bonn and Ankara, 17 years later, with a reference to the 1957 Treaty of Rome:

"The contracting parties agree to be guided by Articles 48 to 50 of the Treaty of Rome in gradually establishing reciprocal right of abode."

A 1973 protocol went into greater detail, saying that freedom to live and work in each other's countries was to be introduced between 1976 and 1986.

This, of course, meant mainly the freedom of Turkish workers to migrate north and work in Germany. A joint body was to work out the small print.

From the mid-70s this body was increasingly leaned on by the Turks, who wanted to see action, but with nearly five million out of work in the EEC countries the 1964 and 1973 pledges looked like proving increasingly difficult to keep.

Turkey appreciated the problem but was still intent on seeing a measure of deregulation implemented.

After protracted talks a decision was reached in December 1976 that allowed the Common Market countries a breathing-space without too openly giving the Turks a brush-off.

A four-year transitional phase was agreed during which both sides would ease access to workers from each other's countries, giving them priority treatment.

But the EEC insisted that this principle could only be upheld on condition that no serious threat to living standards and employment levels arose.

Provisions were also agreed to enhance the social security of Turkish work-change jobs from one Common Market country to another.



Children who lived with their parents were to be guaranteed the right to attend school.

In summer 1980 the EEC countries and Turkey made further painstaking headway towards freedom of abode. Improved terms were to be introduced by the end of November 1983.

Turkish children who had finished school in their host countries were to be given easier access to employment there.

This is still the position, although the accepted view in Bonn is that there can no longer be any question of moves leading to full freedom of movement as envisaged (not without justification) by the Turks.

1986 is no longer felt to be the end of the road but merely, and only in theory, the beginning of a procedure by which an international law commitment is to be met.

Bonn is playing for time in a mixture

There is a growing feeling in Germany that the country is being overrun by migrants and that Bonn is not doing anything about it.

Xenophobia is appalling, but it exists. It is not very surprising, given that we know how the Nazi mind worked.

Now that times are hard, some Germans feel threatened by foreigners.

What the government should do is not imply that the public at large have fascist tendencies. It should read up about how xenophobia is caused.

According to the Social Democrats' Bonn business manager, Peter Glotz, the party is planning a more realistic approach to the problem of foreign residents.

One can but congratulate them on reaching this decision. It is, at least, an admission that they have been unrealistic in the past.

Besides, it is always to be welcomed when people set aside ideological blinkers and take a fresh look at reality.

Yet on closer scrutiny the proposals of the SPD national executive are seen to be mere verbiage in a state assembly election year.

The upper echelons of the SPD are also sensing growing pressure from the party's grass roots, where daily experience evidently teaches a greater sense of reality than life at Space Control in Bonn.

The rank and file have realised that xenophobia is making headway among the general public, with right-wing extremists capitalising on it for all they are worth.

So although one can understand the repeated warnings issued by the SPD leaders against xenophobia, they will be sent in the wrong direction until the Bonn coalition agrees to make substantial amendments to its own policy.

There seem to be insuperable obstacles and inhibitions that make it reluctant to do so. The ruling Social and

of pessimism and an uneasy conscience because the economic situation and resulting political problems rule out abiding by the freedom of abode envisaged by the terms of the association agreement.

Germany would undoubtedly be the main country affected by freedom of abode if it were introduced. This might not have been self-evident in 1964, but it was certainly predictable by 1973.

Other Common Market countries are not in the least interested in protracted renegotiation of the terms with Turkey, but Bonn has got to persuade the other nine to get talking.

Otherwise the floodgates would be due to open in four years. Bonn might be pilloried by world opinion for violating international law commitments.

No-one in Bonn can imagine this happening, but no-one has any idea how to solve the problem either. Common Market countries may be duty-bound to help each other out, but will they?

The Bonn government has already instructed its delegates to aim at negotiating amendments to the terms of association, but it will probably prove costly.

Feeling against foreigners is on the rise

Free Democrats in Bonn for one feel bound to behave generously towards foreigners in view of Germany's Nazi past.

This is very much to their credit. The Third Reich did not occur by coincidence.

In connection with anti-Semitism the government could learn that what Frankfurt sociologist Theodor Adorno called authoritarian personalities (and they exist everywhere at all times) need a fertile soil in which their prejudices can flourish and gain political relevance.

Sensible policies must aim at taking such human responses realistically and preventively into account, bearing in mind that man is made, as Kant put it, of bent wood.

Including foreigners without residence and work permits there must be well over five million living in Germany. Their sheer number is beginning to be too much even for people of good will.

There is clearly a limit beyond which tolerance is overstrained, both in Germany and elsewhere in Europe. A fear of forfeiting national identity may have much to do with it.

This is a fear that tends to make people fall prey to political extremism. So politicians such as Gerhart Baum, Bonn's Free Democratic Interior Minister, who seeks to justify his policies with reference to the Third Reich, will tend to achieve the opposite of what they intend.

He and his political friends may well note that xenophobia is on the increase; they have only themselves to blame.

Bonn naturally realises that too is in financial difficulties that being heightened by population pressure. The Turkish treasury is dependent on remittances from Turkish workers in Western Europe, mainly Germany.

So the only point on which the Turkish authorities might be prepared to make concessions is reunifying families, which as a rule means that Turkish grant workers' families spend in the host country the money they earn there.

Bonn also appreciates that as a matter of principle Ankara is not interested in retaining a permanent source of cheap labour for Western Europe.

So what is needed is for Turkey to make the Turkish government ready to appreciate Western countries' difficulties over freedom of abode.

This, at least, is what the Bonn Foreign Office would like to see, but it is not all plain sailing. Economic presupposes political stability.

This in turn means that the demand for constitutional government and parliamentary democracy is restored.

Bonn diplomats only credit armed forces in Turkey with the ability to keep the country politically stable; there is a conflict of objectives it could land Bonn in a political predicament on this count too.

Stan Martens
(Stuttgarter Zeitung, 22 February 1982)

■ THE ECONOMY

New steps to cut cost of unemployment



The number of registered unemployed seems to be increasing inexorably. The official figure was just under two million at the last count, and despite fine words and job creation schemes there are no signs of serious improvement.

There is a growing realisation that unemployment is not just the hiccup of a dyspeptic economy that can soon be set right.

This is not an excuse for those responsible, especially the Bonn government and the Federal Labour Office in Nuremberg, to set aside any ideas about how to handle the problem.

Bonn's first attempt, aggressively billed last summer as Operation '82, was a programme of spending cuts.

Unemployment is growing increasingly expensive. Each person on the dole now costs about DM24,000 a year. So retraining schemes have been among the first to go.

Drastic cuts in training, retraining and rehabilitation measures for the unemployed are accompanied by stringent cuts in grants for unemployed trainees. The latest regulations are designed to ensure that the least expensive, not the best training schemes are preferred by the Labour Office.

Oddly enough, the new Act for the first time makes mandatory provision for training: mandatory in that the jobless, to stay on the dole, must refrain from doing so.

Bonn has left it to Nuremberg to reconcile such legislative contradictions and frame regulations that make it easier for local labour exchanges to be tougher on jobs that are felt to be suitable for registered job-seekers.

Not content with leaving the small print and the dirty work to the Labour Office, the Bonn government has even laid down a deadline.

Only about half householders who are entitled to social security assistance of one kind and another apply for it and get it. The other half are too ashamed to apply.

This is the conclusion reached in a survey by a Cologne social research unit commissioned by the Bonn Ministry of Family Affairs.

An estimated 1,140,000 households qualify for social security, but only 594,000 get any.

Yet the Ministry of Housing estimates that about 90 per cent of households qualifying for housing allowances successfully apply for them.

House-owners crippled by high interest rates on mortgages have shown increasing readiness to apply for government support of all kinds.

The Cologne survey was based on 1979 and 1980 figures. It found that about 555,000 households entitled to social security preferred to do without it.

Large families and old people are particularly reluctant to apply for help and thus swell the ranks of what used to be known as the genteel poor.

Werner Birkenmeier
(Hannoversche Allgemeine, 22 February 1982)

The end for firm that every schoolboy knows

Last year set a record for insolvencies, with 8,994 companies having to call in the receiver, and the signs are that the trend will continue.

Demand is slack, interest rates are high, taxation is heavy and the cost of labour and materials continues to increase.

Between them they will force many more employers to call it a day, including a large proportion of newcomers to self-employment who miscalculated.

But companies that have called in the receiver also include long-established firms with sound reputations, such as Pelikan, the Hanover office machinery and equipment supplier.

Generations of schoolchildren have used Pelikan pencils, pads and paintsets. Those who went on to become office workers will probably have used Pelikan office aids, from carbon paper to duplicators, too.

There are other reasons why the Pelikan saga deserves attention. The way in which the company went to the wall, jeopardising thousands of jobs, is sadly typical.

It is the tale of a family firm that lacked a willing and able successor to the founder. When the heirs only want to cash in on the proceeds, and are no longer prepared to invest, a company's fate is usually sealed.

Then there are power struggles between the various branches of the family that either paralysed the management or prevented it from exercising effective control.

Banks that only make sure interest on loans and overdrafts is paid on the date it is due also pave the road to corporate perdition.

At Pelikan the works council, or staff representation, seems to have been alone in appreciating how serious the situation was; but it was unable to prevent the collapse.

Now the damage has been done, rescue bids are under way. Parts of the company can surely be salvaged, especially as the authorities are prepared to underwrite loans at the taxpayer's expense.

Public assistance for companies that go to the wall because their owners are either grasping or incompetent cannot be reconciled with a free market economy. Former employees of small firms that closed down without the merest suspicion of public sympathy and support cannot be blamed for taking a dim view of the atavism with which politicians react when a larger company is involved.

But unemployment is so high in Lower Saxony that Birgit Bräuel, the Christian Democrat and banker's daughter at the helm of the Economic Affairs Ministry in Hanover, is unlikely to let events take their course.

She may be a great believer in market forces but she will hardly look on idly and allow the entire Pelikan payroll to be sacked and swell the ranks of jobless.

Owners whose only concern has been to pocket the proceeds must be left to fend for themselves when there is no cash in the kitty.

But there must be clarity on one point. It is that a job salvage operation must not let the owners off the hook at the taxpayer's expense.

Michael Jungblut
(Die Zeit, 26 February 1982)

unemployment figures is enough to disprove this assumption.

Last year the number of vacancies fell by nearly half to a current total of roughly 120,000, including 10,000 offers of part-time work for 240,000 people who would like to work part-time.

The gap between supply and demand is not the only point that shows up Nuremberg's ideas as misconceptions.

The Labour Office mistakenly feels that categorisation of jobless and increasing pressure on them might increase mobility and willingness to accept work of any kind. This is more than doubtful.

The labour market was as mobile last year as it has been in the past. It is not always the same people who are out of work. In 1981 1.6 million people found new jobs via the labour exchange.

Categorisation of the unemployed, from university graduates to unskilled labour, also creates the mistaken impression that unemployment is evenly distributed among all sectors of the population.

In fact, more than half come in the lowest category; 55 per cent are unskilled workers.

Short of putting them on social security there is no way in which this group, currently over one million strong, could be demoted to a lower category after an initial signing-on period of four months as envisaged.

The Nuremberg draft is out on a limb legally too. Case law protects the unemployed from compulsory categorisation and devaluation of their career performance.

The new Act by no means rides roughshod over the way in which the law as is used to stand has been interpreted. Are we to assume that case law is to be overruled by administrative decree?

Or are the new regulations on kinds of job that are considered acceptable for various categories of unemployed meant merely to intimidate and discipline the jobless?

It is high time for plain speaking about unemployment, how the unemployed are to be handled and what job offers are to be considered suitable.

There must be no strings, no tricks and no drafts in the pipeline that are dealt with as though they were confidential dossiers.

Jutta Roitsch
(Frankfurter Rundschau, 25 February 1982)

Too ashamed to accept state handouts

They are motivated mainly by a dislike of the idea of having to rely on government support. Half the old people questioned who by rights would have been entitled to social security allowances did not want to accept gifts from the state.

They equated social security with alms and went without rather than feel like beggars.

Another fear is the worry that relatives and friends will dismiss them as poor if people get to know that they receive welfare payments.

More than half the people questioned who were entitled to social security felt that others looked down on social security recipients.

Two in three stressed that friends, neighbours and relatives in particular

must on no account get to know that they were in receipt.

Another factor is fear of officialdom. Social security recipients were found to feel impotent and helpless in dealing with civil servants.

Over half (55.6 per cent) were afraid of making mistakes in filling in forms. A further 55.2 per cent felt that civil servants were usually hidebound by rules and regulations and unenthusiastic about lending a hand.

Families entitled to social security were well informed as a rule on payments to which they are entitled, but many were found not to realise that they did not have to repay any grants made.

Reluctance to apply for social security is particularly widespread in rural areas, where 30 per cent of families entitled to receive it live, as against 19 per cent of households on average that actually live in the countryside.

In 1980, the Family Affairs Ministry says, social security expenditure totalled DM13.3bn.

ddp
(Stuttgarter Nachrichten, 25 February 1982)

■ TRADE

Soybeans, grain, steel — one man's subsidy is another man's unfair practice

Differences between America and Europe over agricultural and industrial practices are just as sharp as the disputes over interest rates and security.

The main bone of contention is subsidies. The air is thick with accusation and counter-accusation.

According to the Americans, Europe is using subsidies to increase the competitiveness of both steel and farm products, principally grain.

Europeans say farm price guarantees are not hurting the Americans who, in any case, are themselves subsidizing grain exports through low-rate loan facilities.

They also say that the American steel industry is trying to bounce European manufacturers out by creating an unpredictable market place.

A taste of the nature of the dispute can be gauged from a speech by US Agriculture Secretary John R. Block.

He told the Senate agricultural committee in December that American farmers "are by all means prepared to compete with other grain producers."

"But they are not prepared to enter into competition with foreign finance ministries, and we are not going to let them be forced to do so."

In 1980, he said, "the European Community exported 14 million tonnes of grain, twice as much as three years previously and mainly by means of export subsidies."

6 We have the right to sell... In Europe and we will fight to keep that right?

"Subsidies have led to a swift decline in world market prices that is costing US farmers 50 cents a bushel and the US government an extra \$400m in the financial year that lies ahead."

"I urgently pointed out to the EEC Commissioners that it was high time the Community came to grips with its basic problem, the problem of surplus farm output."

"It is a surplus encouraged by high tariff barriers on the one hand and by export subsidies on the other."

Mr Block was reporting to the Senate committee on his talks with Poul Dalsager, the EEC's Danish Commissioner for Agriculture, in Brussels.

If the tenor of his speech to the Senate was one of, say, plain speaking it was nowhere near as plain as the way he addressed his European hosts at times.

They told him in Brussels that Europe's share of the world grain market had increased, but not at America's expense, since the United States had retained its much larger share of the market.

But Mr Block is said to have replied, in an aggrieved tone, that America did not recognise any such thing as a world market share gained by means of export subsidies.

He evidently felt obliged to sound a similar note to the European public. "We have a right to sell soybeans to Europe," he told a Press conference, "and we intend to fight for the right."

These words were a little too strong for the taste of Secretary of State Haig



and US trade envoy Brock, who accompanied Mr Block to Brussels.

Before the Agriculture Secretary was able to carry on he was interrupted by Mr Haig, who added: "But with elegance." And the Secretary of State put on a smile to take the edge of the atmosphere.

It remains to be seen whether Mr Haig, who seems to be Europe's only friend in the US administration, will hold his own in Washington in the long term.

At present there are few signs of elegance in relations between Europe and America. Transatlantic friendship is on everyone's lips but no longer in evidence.

If farm or steel price subsidies were the only bone of contention it would not be so bad. Rules have been drawn up for coping with clashes of this kind without waging a trade war.

With a little goodwill on both sides they should be able to prevent one. But, sad to say, America and Europe are at daggers drawn in just about every department.

Deep-seated differences of opinion on the right security policy to adopt toward the Soviet Union go more than skin-deep, because they shake the very foundations of North Atlantic partnership.

European objections to the American budget deficit and to the high interest rates it prompts are just as destructive and demoralising, being tantamount to accusations of being inconsiderate and intolerably egoistic.

With all three pots on the boil simultaneously (security policy, interest rates and subsidies), the impression may easily arise in Washington that Europe is in the process of parting company with America.

Who can say how a capricious US Congress is going to react to an impression of this kind? Its response could be unpredictable and that is the risk.

The clash over steel entails nothing irrational, but it does include a fair amount of unfair play. The rules of the game are being misused.

The major US steel corporations, led by US Steel, Bethlehem Steel and Republic Steel, have lodged more than 90 appeals against subsidies to and dumping by the European steel industry with the International Trade Commission and the Department of Commerce in Washington.

All major steel producers in the EEC stand accused of unfair or restrictive practices. They are said to sell steel in the United States at less than the minimum prices laid down to protect home industry from dumping.

In some cases they are even accused of selling at prices lower than in European markets, and definitely at less than cost price as shown in company balance sheets.

The European steel industry is also accused of indirectly putting US steel-makers to disadvantage by being subsidised to the point at which it can cut prices in world markets.

US steel corporations have appealed against every category of steel imported from Europe except rolled wire and steel for reinforced concrete.

The ailing steel industries of Belgium, Britain, France and Italy are mainly accused of export subsidies, while Dutch, German and Luxembourg manufacturers are busy filling in forms from Washington in response to accusations of dumping.

The Europeans are not denying the allegations. They are undercutting US minimum import price levels, which are assessed in terms of cost in Japan, plus an eight-per-cent profit margin.

They are tempted to undercut by the strength of the dollar, and they can hardly deny the billions paid in subsidies when without them all major manufacturers in Belgium, Britain, France and Italy would long since have had to call in the receiver.

They base their defence on a different approach. US trigger prices do not entitle the US customs authorities to send cheaper imports back to their country of origin.

They are merely levels below which the exporter is felt to be charging dumping prices, since if normal commercial yardsticks were applied he would hardly be able to sell steel at less than the price charged by the most efficient Japanese manufacturers.

Dumping charges, only stand to be substantiated with tangible results if, by the terms of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the US steel industry is found to be hit by the dumping.

This point must also be proved if a subsidy case is to be won, and US steel corporations are unlikely to prove their case because European steel exports to America are on the decline.

Last year steelmakers in the Common Market countries export 4.3 million tonnes of steel worth about \$2bn to the United States. In 1979 exports to America totalled 7.5 million tonnes.

US manufacturers, like the steel industry everywhere, are hit by substantial surplus capacity. Yet last year, in a flagging US economy, domestic output of raw steel registered a slight increase of 7.3 per cent to 108 million tonnes.

6 American steelmen trying to bounce out the Europeans?

European manufacturers wish they could say the same. Last year's output in the European Community was 2.5 per cent down at 125 million tonnes.

So US steelmakers cannot prove their case that undercutting has hit the industry in America, and the Europeans are banking on this argument prevailing.

They undercut US trigger prices. They subsidise the steel industry. They still have an easy conscience and even accuse their US opposite numbers of being unfair.

They claim the US steel industry knows full well that its case does not hold water and that the steel corporations in Pittsburgh are not really interested in either dumping or subsidies.

The rules of the game are said merely

to be a means to an end, that of making steel imports unpredictable and, locally, of bouncing European manufacturers out of the US market.

Many US orders are said in Brussels to have been cancelled because importers no longer know how much they are going to end up having to pay.

Were it not for export subsidies, dealers in the EEC readily admit, would not be able to sell a single tonne abroad.

But with prices guaranteed by the EEC, business is brisk. In 1980 the European Community invested the equivalent of DM13bn in food export subsidies.

About DM3bn went towards subsidising grain exports and DM7bn towards subsidising exports of milk products.

There can be no denying that the Common Market solves its farm surplus problems by buying produce on the one hand and by exporting it on the other.

This is a policy that is bound to cause trouble with virtually the entire world, especially major competitors in the farm produce trade, primarily the United States.

American complaints in this department are valid, says Eberhard Rhein, the European Commission, the right hand man of Wilhelm Haferkamp, Commission for Foreign Trade.

6 Importers cancelling orders because of uncertainties over prices?

Between 1973 and 1980 the EEC increased agricultural exports by 210 per cent, as against 130 per cent for the United States. EEC sales account for 11.4 per cent of the world market, as against 9.5 per cent in 1975.

The United States has held its own, steady 17 per cent. America still commands half the world grain market but steadily gaining ground.

Just as it objects to the cases led by US steelmakers, the European Commission objects to the accusations led by Agriculture Secretary Block.

In both cases the Brussels Europeans say America is not hit by European practices. In world markets it is holding its own.

Besides, Washington also subsidises grain exports, not perhaps at the producer stage but at the point of sale by offering long-term concessional-rate facilities to buyers all over the world.

So in view of high commercial interest rates and inflation, grain shipped from the United States are a given and the Europeans say.

As for accusations that Europe is trying to elbow US competitors out of the flour market, Brussels experts say America provides grain buyers with flour mills free of charge, which amounts to the same.

But European arguments carry little conviction. America is well advised to jawbone; the Common Market would like to see the United States agree to self-restraint in exports of soybeans and maize corn fodder.

If the European Community were to succeed in a reform of Common Agricultural Policy it would be keenly interested in signing long-term food supply contracts with Third World countries.

Mr Block does not have a right to sell soybeans to Europe, but Europe would be forfeiting its right to consider itself a reliable Atlantic partner of the US.

Continued on page 8

■ BUSINESS

Builders being undercut by illegal operators

Herr Friiske has written to the Yugoslav ambassador in Bonn, Radovan Makić, and his government in Belgrade requesting their cooperation and assistance.

"In our trade," he wrote, "a state of affairs has arisen that can only be compared with the Mafia and is without precedent in the history of craftsmanship and in the Federal Republic of Germany."

"It has been brought about by the criminal methods of Yugoslav owners of fake companies and by press-gangings of workers."

He has appealed to the Yugoslav authorities to do all they can to ensure that the activities of these illegal companies in Germany do not harm the reputation of their country in Bavaria.

Figures were recently submitted to the Bavarian state assembly and have yet to be disputed. They indicate that in the Munich area alone about 20,000 workmen work illegally in the building trade.

Established local firms are the losers, especially Herr Friiske's plasterers, who are no longer able to compete and have to shut down.

His group claims the plastering trade is at the end of its tether, and Josef Grünbeck, Free Democratic economic other building trades are increasingly jeopardised.

Since January a new law has been in

force prohibiting the lump system of labour hire on building sites entirely.

But the new Act is unlikely to put a stop to the activities of the Yugo-Mafia. A Munich inland revenue officer frankly admits that it is a waste of time. "It is," he says, "stupid and pretty well beside the point."

The illegal work to which Herr Friiske and his associates object is a special kind of "black work."

There are companies that legally employ a payroll of 20 but in reality employ up to 100 and more plasterers who come to Germany as tourists.

These companies, usually run by Yugoslavs, naturally pay neither income tax nor social security nor health insurance contributions for the working holidaymakers.

So it is hardly surprising that they can regularly afford to undercut German companies in public works contracts and still earn handsome profits.

There is an increasing trend towards Yugoslavs setting up a gang of construction workers back home. They then all come to Germany as tourists and work on building sites.

They do piece-work as gangs, are not registered anywhere and, of course, pay no tax or insurance. In this way they can earn up to DM9,000 a month each.

Work is arranged in advance by a fellow-countryman who either advertises or goes round the sites. Pay is in cash as soon as the work is completed, and receipts are signed on behalf of some company or other that is untraceable because it doesn't exist.

The third category of company is the one-man firm, usually a Yugoslav with his office in the boot of his car.

The telephone number in the letterhead of his company is as likely as not to be that of a bar in the Munich area where foreign workers congregate.

Over a beer or a slivovitz the boss puts gangs together after work. They often work in the evenings or at weekends — after their normal job.

The gangs are usually made up of foreign workers with regular jobs and a valid work permit who would like to earn a little money on the side.

By no means infrequently they will report sick for a few days to be able to earn the extra, but one point all these companies have in common is that they are hard to trace.

"By the time we get to learn anything they are over the hill and far away," says an inland revenue man.

Herr Friiske and his colleagues say, on the strength of experience, that the authorities can be slow to act even when they are given the tip-off.

This again is not surprising, given that there are a dozen agencies responsible in one way or another for dealing with illicit work.

Their powers are so limited and evenly distributed that each, on its own, cannot do much: certainly not enough to be seen by illegal employers as a serious threat.

So the public prosecutor is seldom presented with a case, as the Yugoslavs have not been slow to notice; they are busy making hay while the sun shines.

There seems to be so little trouble, from the "black" employer's point of view, that these companies often submit tenders for public works contracts —

and are usually awarded the contract because their bid is lowest.

So it is that the state and local authorities unwittingly help to toll the death knell of German companies.

"What happens is that we are forced to close down and pay off our men while the illegal operators corner the trade and pay neither tax nor insurance."

In this way, Herr Friiske says, the state pays the bill several times over. Tax evasion runs into millions, and so does unemployment and sickness benefit.

The problem has existed for years and Josef Friiske is well-known at the Ministries in Munich where he regularly urges officials to take sterner action.

But for all his campaigning he has made no more headway than Herr Grünbeck, who says he feels like a fool, as though he were sent running around in circles.

Herr Grünbeck is not the only one to feel this way. Richard Gürteler, a state assemblyman for the ruling Christian Social Union, also says he is sick and tired of the feeble answers he is given.

He is referring to Ministry replies to persistent queries on "black" employment, which Herr Grünbeck refers to as an evergreen topic in the state assembly.

Yet the Bavarian government would do well to take action. Herr Friiske is

not alone in feeling that this particular laxity is a Bavarian speciality.

Nowhere in Germany do illicit Yugoslav operators have such a stranglehold on the construction industry as in Bavaria.

Herr Grünbeck feels a special commission ought to be set up to deal with these shady operators. Similar commissions have been set up and done good work in other parts of the country.

But the Bavarian government has said on more than one occasion that it takes a dim view of such measures. Why, it won't even beef up existing facilities!

The inland revenue's fraud squad is woefully short of staff, and for the past two years its factory inspection manpower has even been reduced by not replacing staff who quit or retire.

Another approach might have been to amend construction regulations to require contractors to keep lists of all companies whose services they use.

Yet despite strong recommendations to adopt this amendment, the economic affairs and legal committees of the state assembly have deleted this proposal from an amendment package.

The taxmen say the only way to really tackle the problem is to penalise the contractors as well as the illicit companies they hire.

But neither in Bavaria nor in Germany as a whole are there any indications of serious plans to take action of this kind, and the inland revenue thinks it knows why.

That would hardly be in the interest of the major construction companies, who cost their bids on the strength of cut-price illicit labour.

No-one would for a moment admit this is the case, the taxmen readily admit. But the big boys' lobby is always more powerful than that of the small fry.

Josef Friiske is in no mood to throw in the towel. He is keeping up his campaign because he just cannot believe the powers that be are prepared to look idly on while an entire trade goes to the dogs.

Christian Schneider
(Süddeutsche Zeitung, 17 February 1982)


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PERSPECTIVE

'German freedom would be the price if America abandoned Europe'

What would happen if the US were to withdraw from Europe? What would the prospects be for the Federal Republic of Germany and how would Britain and France react? The scenario, as seen by Rolf F. Pauls, a former German ambassador to the United States, is that America would remain a world power, whereas Germany would become a plaything of Soviet power politics.

Arthur F. Burns, the US ambassador in Bonn, prominent US elder statesman and head of the Federal Reserve system for many years, said in a speech last December that:

"The American people makes a material and personal sacrifice by stationing roughly 350,000 American soldiers in Europe.

"They are stationed here to ensure the peace is kept and the democratic way of life can be maintained in Western society. They will not stay if they are no longer welcome."

He made this point again in an interview with *Vorwärts*, the weekly newspaper of the SPD (reprinted in *The German Tribune* of 31 January).

The German assistants of the Soviet policy of disinformation have long sought, in their bids to drive a wedge between Germans and Americans, to persuade us that there is nothing to choose between the East Bloc and the West.

They are equal in political and ethical quality, it is claimed, and as systems by which the two superpowers maintain their influence merely serve the superpowers' interests.

Such arguments have not been without effect, befogging common sense as has been shown by the emergence of the "peace movement" and by resolutions passed at a number of regional conferences of the Social Democratic Party.

Yet there can be no getting round one point. It is that when the Soviet Union's presence is not wanted Russia grows increasingly stubborn, whereas if the Americans are no longer wanted they will go.

That is exactly what will happen if political decisions in Germany make it impossible for the US government to equip with an adequate deterrent capacity the operational bulk of these 350,000 US soldiers who face Soviet continental superiority in both conventional and nuclear armaments.

Only if US forces in Europe are adequately equipped will the US President be able to assume responsibility for allowing them to continue to be stationed in Europe.

Failing a crucial cut in the number of Soviet intermediate-range nuclear forces the deterrent effect of missile modernisation will benefit US forces in Europe and their European allies in equal measure.

We Europeans or Germans are not US hostages. The hostages, if that is the right term, are the roughly one million US citizens, including servicemen and their families, who are here to keep the peace in Europe as they have done for the past 30 years.

What, then, would be the consequences of a US withdrawal?

The United States would remain a world power even though forward, de-

terent defence would no longer begin at the border with the GDR and Czechoslovakia.

Conditions would deteriorate considerably for the United States in the wake of the loss of close political and military collaboration with Western Europe.

But America would still be a world power, based on its Atlantic and Pacific naval and air power, its strategic nuclear potential and its financial might.

It would, of course, then pursue policies that paid only limited attention to the interests of Western Europe.

Europe would not face an immediate threat of war; the Soviet Union would not need to wage one. But it would inevitably backslide into a state of affairs that has unfairly been ascribed to the Finns.

It is a little unfair on our Finnish friends, who have prudently and courageously sought to maintain their independence by a policy to which there is no alternative.

Gradually Europe would slip into the wake of the Soviet sphere of influence and forfeit its freedom of action — me-



rely because the Germans have lost their nerve.

They would have done so at the very moment in history when the full extent of the gravest crisis ever faced by Soviet Communism became apparent, in Poland, and lost not only their nerve but also gone out of their minds.

Unfortunately the Germans are of crucial importance for continental Western Europe by virtue of their potential and their geopolitical position.

Great Britain would have to sever its ties with the Continent and would be sure to do so, retreating to the special relationship of an Atlantic naval system based firmly on ties with the United States.

A US troop withdrawal from Germany would be followed by the evacuation of the BAOR. The 1954 Brussels Treaty, the Western European Union treaty on the basis of which British troops are based in Germany, is closely connected with the US commitment to station troops in Europe.

The Brussels Treaty, which over and above the North Atlantic Treaty includes an automatic commitment to provide military support, would be an empty shell.

France pursues an independent policy within Nato but can only afford to do so in the lee of the US nuclear deterrent and the US military presence in neighbouring Germany.

Continued from page 8

were to simply exclude America from traditional markets.

Seldom have Ministers and experts from both sides of the Atlantic put their heads together as often as at present. It remains to be seen whether they have been paying any attention to what the others have to say. The trend is not clear.

It would seek closer ties with Britain and America as an Atlantic and a Mediterranean power. The special relationship between Bonn and Paris that has developed over the years would atrophy.

France would be bound to consider the Federal Republic of Germany mainly as a military glacis to its east.

It is hard to imagine the United States maintaining its tiny military establishment in Berlin without the backing of its much more substantial military presence in the Federal Republic.

So West Berlin's position would be rendered most insecure.

The full importance of the US military presence in the Federal Republic and Berlin is, over and above the actual military clout it has, the fact that it consists of Americans.

To this day, and specially in view of the critical situation in Poland, Eastern Europe and Afghanistan, the Soviet Union is loath to risk an open and violent clash with the United States.

So even assuming, which is most unlikely, that Western Europe were to decide to replace the 350,000 US forces by new units of its own, it would be unable to prevent the collapse of its deterrent and defence potential.

The North Atlantic Treaty might remain but it would be doomed to insignificance. It does not include an automatic commitment to provide military support.

This shortcoming of the treaty has been virtually offset in the past by the unprecedented military integration for a defence pact maintained by free nations.

If the Americans were no longer physically present in Europe this integration could not possibly be maintained.

The smaller European members of Nato, possibly excepting Norway, would be forced to follow Germany's example and pursue a policy of appeasement toward the Soviet Union.

In view of Mediterranean and Middle East affairs the United States would be sure to maintain its Sixth Fleet in the Med.

The Italians, with a significant role to play in the Mediterranean, have always pursued consistent alliance policies despite domestic difficulties.

With a clear sense of proportion and moderation they and the Spaniards could be expected to rely firmly on the United States.

Neutral countries in northern and eastern Europe, bereft of their powerful Nato hinterland would be up against it in ties with the Soviet Union.

The Helsinki accords are looking a little threadbare as it is; they could not possibly survive if there were no longer a US presence in Europe.


Economic affairs and trade are a

Will they come to terms or will they be at such odds that they no longer stop short at full-scale trade war with the full range of tariff barriers?

We may well find out at the next Western economic summit, in Versailles at the beginning of June.

Winfried Münster

(Hannoversche Allgemeine, 20 February 1982)



Rolf Pauls... 'Europe must not lose nerve'.

matter of hard cash, but also, and to a great extent, of confidence. Had it been firmly embedded in the West, the EEC, the Federal Republic has never been able to emerge as a major trading power solely on the strength of a hard-working and efficient economy.

But without a firm political foundation it no longer works. If Bonn stands aloof from the United States it would be an inevitable worldwide loss of confidence and a trade policy in frontation.

A profound economic recession would result, in comparison with the present crisis would be a loss. There would be no way in which depression could be offset by trade in the East, which in any case we could no longer afford to finance.

The dollar might be temporarily but the Deutschmark would be out and out. It would not long remain freely convertible currency.

The Soviet Union would be engaged to continue jeopardising supplies raw materials to Europe, which can only be ensured by means of close cooperation with America.

Our dependence on the Soviet Union would increase rapidly. Germany's domestic stability and social peace would go by the board.

Since there is no longer a German national consensus stability depends on the economic situation in Germany than it does in other Western countries.

The more closely we have collaborated with the Americans over the years the greater our influence has been. US opinion and the more interesting have been to the Kremlin.

A Federal Republic of Germany had gone into voluntary isolation we have no influence whatever in Washington, while for the Soviet Union it was no longer be a political partner to be taken seriously.

Over the past 35 years there have been many differences of opinion between Germany and America. They have been surmounted because the consensus was intact.

What is now happening is dangerous because it calls this consensus in question.

The wave of anti-Americanism in Germany is in the process of triggering a storm of anti-Germanism in the United States that could, in a matter of years, make it impossible for any President to continue with present alliance policies.

America could survive. Germany, as much as its western half intends to remain a free country, could not.

Rolf F. Pauls

(Die Welt, 13 February 1982)

CIVIL EMERGENCY

Nuclear disaster squad 'needs 5 hours notice'

If an accident happened tomorrow at Würgassen nuclear power station in the Weser foothills, expert help would not arrive for more than five hours. The Federal Republic has a special squad to handle emergencies at nuclear plants.

But a member of the squad said, that from its base near Karlsruhe, it would take a good five and a half hours to get to the Würgassen station.

The distance as the crow flies is a little over 300 kilometres (a shade under 200 miles).

This admission was made under questioning by Wolfgang Neumann at a meeting in Cologne of 100 disaster control officers from nuclear power stations and chemical works.

They met at the Cologne headquarters of the Rhineland TÜV, or technical inspection agency, to discuss emergency measures.

Discussion touched on a wide variety of subjects including:

- At what stage the alarm bells should sound in public.

- How effective dummy emergencies are.

- What the value of public information leaflet campaigns are.

On just about every point, there were disagreements.

The Supreme Court has ruled that nuclear power stations and chemical



Dressed and armed to fight a chemical spillage.

(Photo: Archiv)

There has never been a reactor mishap in Germany.

In the chemical industry too there has not, for 10 years, been an incident that anywhere near warranted being termed a catastrophe, as Herr Nimptsch of BASF put it.

Deskbound emergency regulation administrators were able at the meeting to gain a clearer idea of what unexpected and unpredictable things could happen in an emergency.

A major upset was their topic: radiation, gas or toxins leaked at a nuclear power station or chemical works and threatening to contaminate the surroundings.

They hope and are confident they can handle an emergency of this kind. So do we all, and since practice makes perfect, experiments and trials are sure to prove fairly expensive.

The Supreme Court has ruled that nuclear power stations and chemical

works cannot be held responsible for disaster relief expenditure beyond their factory installations.

Further risks, the court decided, were an act of God, the cost of which should be met by society as a whole.

As a result, disaster control expenditure for power stations in Bavaria alone cost the taxpayer DM1m a year, according to Hans Störner of the Munich Interior Ministry.

The Ministry has yet to work out the true price per kilowatt of nuclear power when this additional expenditure is taken into account.

Cologne, which is encircled by chemical works, was more interested in provisions relating to the chemical industry.

On just about every point in the book differences of opinion arose, starting with information for the general public about what measures were envisaged in the event of an emergency.

A number of chemical works have circulated leaflets to explain what to do in an emergency, but experts now feel such campaigns are of limited value.

They must certainly be repeated every three or four years. After a couple of years instructions, as a rule, are forgotten or mislaid.

Views also differ on when the general public ought to be warned. There is said to be little point in unnecessarily alarming the public over gas leaks that turn out to be only negligible.

But if the experts decide to wait until higher readings make public warnings indispensable, it may be too late.

A public official with responsibility for disaster control challenged the claim by a spokesman for a chemicals manufacturer that his company could work out in 5 to 10 minutes where a cloud of gas or toxins would land.

But the company spokesman said his claim was based on constant practice with the police and backed up by practical experience.

When a major disaster happens, his critic said, we all know it takes a little longer than 5 or 10 minutes.

The cloud moves faster than the time it takes to sound the alarm, with the result that all relief workers can do is mop up disaster victims, he claimed.

The company spokesman said that would only be the case if there were a major chlorine leak.

Evacuation was one of the most serious problems. There could be no dummy runs, partly because no-one was prepared to run the insurance risk of any accidents that might happen.

It would take a genuine emergency to show whether thousands of families could be evacuated from their homes in minutes. Many might not want to do so, for fear of looters or "because they

didn't want to leave their budgerigar alone."

Time alone would tell whether transport facilities were adequate and roads congested or blocked by gas clouds or kindergartens or old people's homes should be evacuated first.

Should emergency ward or intensive care unit hospital patients be left to their own devices? Should the prisons be evacuated?

A Düsseldorf local government official sounded an optimistic note. "We have had to carry out evacuation manoeuvres twice in recent months and both times everything has run smoothly," he said.

Another official from southern Germany said one exercise, previously announced, had been successful, but a repetition held a fortnight later had been disastrous because advance notice was not given.

"In the chemical industry," a spokesman said, "I cannot imagine people being evacuated without running an even greater risk than if evacuation plans were dropped."

"Our mishaps are calculable. We know when the worst will be over. So it would be best to tell people to get indoors, to seal doors and windows and to wait until the gas has dispersed."

In summer this might be the best course of action, but in winter, a critic said, central heating would have to be switched off and people would freeze to death.

But this was all theory. Practical experience, Hans Störner was happy to say, had yet to be gained.

Herr Neumann of the flying squad set up by German nuclear power stations to handle emergencies was most impressed by a disaster training course he attended in Nevada.

"It amounted to shock therapy, he told the course."

A radiation disaster was simulated in a disused military reactor in the deserts of Nevada, and as part of the exercise a contaminated reactor worker staggered round the building.

He was hopping mad at the lack of safety precautions and "lashed out at us so furiously," says Neumann, "that I for one was on the point of running for it."

Neumann's role was that of a rescue worker. One of the sights he saw was an injured man, armless and legless. "He was just a mass of bleeding flesh. I had no idea how to get him on to the stretcher."

A senior hospital doctor behaved in what Neumann described as an incredible manner to prevent a makeshift radiation unit from being set up in his hospital to accommodate radiation victims.

Ugly crowds and reporters with incessant questions hampered rescue operations so much that the relief squad was virtually unable to work properly.

When the squad worked their way in to the reactor building, which was full of hot steam, to switch a valve off, their masks steamed up so badly that they could no longer see.

All they could do was feel their way over to where the valve was while the alarm sounded — blaringly, incessantly.

The tale as he tells it is most impressive. Actors convincingly played their parts, bouncers threw punches and one man on the course left the hot steam with a bad leg injury.

Incendiary workers arranged explosions in which the lighting fell from the ceiling. Make-up artists mocked up injuries the sight of which was almost more than he could bear.

Friedrich K. Kuryla

(Kölnische Stadt-Anzeiger, 19 February 1982)



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
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BERLIN FILM FESTIVAL

Fassbinder wins award for drug story with an added dimension

Director Rainer Werner Fassbinder was awarded the Golden Bear at the Berlin film festival for his latest film *Die Sehnsucht der Veronika Voss* (The Longing of Veronika Voss).

He arrived at the premiere wearing a smart dove-grey pin-striped suit and looking as though he had the award in the bag, or so festival regulars said.

The title and storyline give the superficial impression that the material is pulp magazine stuff. It tells the tale of an aging morphium addict of a film star.

She is taken to the cleaners by an ice-cold woman doctor claiming to be a neurologist and then deliberately prompted to commit suicide.

It sounds like the story of Third Reich film star Sibylle Schmitz, who was a drug addict and tried to commit suicide by taking an overdose of pills.

Fassbinder said in Berlin that she had inspired him to make the film. The screenplay was written by Peter Märthesheimer and Pea Fröhlich.

Die Sehnsucht der Veronika Voss is one of the finest black-and-white films to have been made for some time in Germany, with its subtle use of light.

It is also one of Fassbinder's finest achievements, being unexceptionable in its choice of stylistic means to the point of self-denial, making it formally boring for a film by Fassbinder.

It conjures memories of Billy Wilder's *Sunset Boulevard*, with William Holden as the gossip columnist and Bette Davis as an aging screen star.

They meet by coincidence in her mausoleum of a home and he gives her a little emotional warmth and fresh hope. In Fassbinder's film the columnist's part is played by Hilmar Thate as a sports reporter.

The film is set in 50s Berlin, with nondescript street scenes and the reporter's nondescript apartment. He has a pre-war radio churning out parliamentary debates on whether or not to join Nato and works in an open-plan newspaper office.

Cameraman Franz Xaver Schwarzenberger uses light filters and a smoke generator to good effect, creating a foggy, mysterious setting reminiscent of Hollywood predecessors.

The doctor's apartment is a stark contrast, a cold dream in sterile white, with mirrors reflecting the light and creating an effect of scurrying, transparent brightness.

The film is more than the drug story Fassbinder makes it out to be. It is a declaration of love of the cinema that for the first time shows us a Fassbinder bowed over his material almost unselfishly.

But there is a little too much identification with it and a little too little productive resistance.

The festival jury were expected to take longer than usual, given that the major German film of the year was probably Werner Herzog's *Fitzcarraldo*.

Herzog's film is the official German entry for the Cannes film festival this year, but there could not be said to have been a truly outstanding film on show in Berlin.

There certainly wasn't one among the official entries, although arguably there was some interesting material in the unofficial show, which this year out-

shone by far the Young Film Forum as a source of surprises, discoveries and alternatives.

There was, for instance, *Gallipoli* by Peter Weir, the Australian director of *The Flood* and *Valentine's Day Picnic*. It is a tale of friendship shared by two men, tender and intense.

It is also a dramatic and melancholy reminder of a national trauma, the First World War episode in the Dardanelles where a company of Anzacs was sent in by incompetent British commanders and wiped out by the Germans and Turks.

There are moments at which *Gallipoli* reminds one of Kurusawa's masterpiece *Kagemusha*.

It may be a mystification of war but it is more humane than the more or less cynical stripping of humanity for man, the cannon-fodder shaking in its boots that is what the so-called critical realism of anti-war films usually ends up with.

Several official entries achieved more than a *succès d'estime*, however. They included the Swedish entry, *The Simpleton Murderer*, the tale of a boy with a speech defect who is looked on as an idiot and one day hits back at his environment.

Isn't It My Life? was the US entry, directed by John Badham and starring first-rate actors. It dealt with the problem of euthanasia, and did so with more than top marks for good intentions.

Richard Dreyfuss plays a sculptor paralysed in an accident, John Cassavetes the doctor who wants to keep him

alive at all costs and despite his pain and suffering. The film is a vast improvement on the usual well-meaning TV film, dealing urgently with the subject and never getting lost in abstraction or moralising. It is also most professional, without being overly so. Film festivals inevitably tend to overdo it. There were 108 showings on one day at Berlin. Who could possibly wade through all that?

How is one to retain some sense of judgement? How is one to remain receptive to the less spectacular, subtler approach? The numbers game is inflationary and bad.

Pierre Granier-Deferre, a 54-year-old French veteran as a cutter and assistant director, had his latest film, *The Woman at the Window*, shown in Berlin. It followed his *The Marital Cage* and is his best yet.

A Strange Tale was the only official French entry, but unofficial entries included Tavernier's original and lively *The Pigsty* and Verneuil's *Thousand Billion Dollars*.

The *Strange Tale* begins as a typically Parisian story of a *me-too-do-well*, but a lucky one, who earns his living by 'chatting' with his workmates.

It imperceptibly develops into a case



Veronika Voss, played by Rosal Zech.

(Photo: Filmverlag der Autoren)

study of human and social authority and its vocabulary of power.

Michel Piccoli as the new boss of young PR man Louis Coline, played by Gérard Lanvin, for which the hero was not prepared.

They include unexpected gestures of friendship and surprising tokens of trust and confidence.

Coline works hard for the new boss, who moves into his home, ruins his marriage and ties of friendship and abandons him as an empty shell.

Suddenly one day, as suddenly and mysteriously as he appeared, he vanishes again. *A Strange Tale* is more than a white-collar psychological thriller.

It is a complex and profound, yet seemingly nonchalant and unassuming narrative study of the master and man, topic or father and son relationship.

Brigitte Desalm

(Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger, 20 February 1982)

Too many heads spoil the subtitles

While one film critic in Berlin may say he has yet to see a good film at this year's festival, another may reply that he has not yet seen a bad one.

But what is a good film these days? It is hard to say when you no longer have any specific expectations or yardsticks.

There are films you watch and take in. They are by no means boring. The seat is comfortable. There is action on the screen and it is cold outside.

The Zoo-Palast, where the official Berlin film festival entries and specials were shown, is a fine cinema. It is one of the last really large ones, still churning out illusions. One wonders how long it will stay in business as it is.

So the official entries definitely have the best of it. The Delphi, where the Forum entries were shown, may also be a large cinema but it is ill-suited for films with subtitles.

Most films in this section of the festival ran original soundtracks with subtitles, which was a pleasant change from the usual German dubbing, but unfortunately people's heads kept getting in the way.

It would have been so easy to tilt the projectors a little higher so that everyone could see everything. One wonders why this wasn't done.

Maybe it was because the forum is generally held to be a loss-maker and waste of time, resulting in the self-filling decision to keep it short of cash.

Something certainly ought to be done about this state of affairs. The forum has long been the attraction of the Berlin film festival, and not just for film freaks but for the ordinary Berlin film-going public.

with his *The Forgery*: the civil war in Lebanon and the partition of Beirut.

Two people who live in different parts of the city try to meet again. They were in love with each other, had just fallen in love, when the war parted them.

True, it's an old story, except that this time it is not a river that separates the young lovers but a demarcation line dividing a city.

The Lebanese director's strong point is his patiently observed authenticity. *Encounter in Beirut* is a film of slow motion, of standstill, of observation, of speechlessness and mourning.

Unfortunately, the director disavows the unpretentious earnest of his film a little in a postscript screened as a party given to mark the end of location work.

At his party the people present discuss whether the man, who has returned to Beirut, while the woman, a fellow-student, has emigrated to the United States without having got to see him again, ought to commit suicide or not.

Heidi Genée's children's film *Kraftprobe* (Trial of Strength) was a film without images and lacking in expression, as it were. Its topic was that of a Swedish entry last year, a child left alone in the big city, but the Swedish film was better and more imaginative.

Betrayal was the title of a Norwegian film on a similar subject that left an entirely different impression. We see the last days of the Second World War and the first months of peace in Norway through a little girl's eyes.

We are mainly shown her family and its decline and fall. Her father is having

Continued on page 12

■ THE BUILT ENVIRONMENT

Report on open-plan offices
stirs a hornet's nest

Munich biochemist Frederic Vester, an authority on stress, says that the sight of the boss all day at work is sure to make you ill sooner or later.

A survey commissioned by the Bonn Labour Ministry may not reach such drastic conclusions but it too rules that open-plan offices tend to make people ill.

The report was compiled by the Rhineland region of the TÜV, or Technical Inspection Association, the agency most Germans associate with two-year road-worthiness tests on motor vehicles.

Its findings, that open-plan offices are not healthy, went to the Labour Ministry, where state secretary Anke Fuchs has used them as the basis of a political demand.

If humanisation of the working world is to be more than a slogan, she says, open-plan offices must be scrapped in the long term.

This news came as a profound shock to planners at the desks of their individual, managerial offices. Had they been misled for the past 20 years?

For the past two decades it has generally been assumed that open-plan offices with greenery and partitions is the best, the most progressive and most humane arrangement there is.

The open plan is accompanied by friendly colour patterns, expensive air conditioning units, sound-absorbing carpets and neat canteens for the tea or coffee break.

The TÜV inspectors spent two years testing conditions in six different open-plan offices and found that the staff suffered from headaches, poor digestion and lack of sleep.

They felt they lacked privacy, were constantly interrupted and disturbed, and hampered by bad light, bad air and poor acoustics.

They complained of having to work in public, of needing excessive powers of concentration and of being unable to influence surroundings.

They could not individually arrange their heating, lighting and ventilation and were overwhelmingly (95 per cent of a sample of 291 office workers) against the open plan.

These findings were bound to cause a stir. The TÜV office in Cologne and the Labour Ministry in Bonn were bombarded with telephone calls from aggrieved open-plan office designers and constructors.

They were also snowed under with phone calls and letters of thanks from open-plan office workers. Newspapers too were sent readers' letters on the subject.

The report seemed to have stirred up a hornet's nest. Managements of companies with open-plan offices are busy thinking up counter-moves.

A Bavaria-based study group on modern office technology has held a seminar in Düsseldorf on: "Do Open-Plan Offices Make People Ill?"

In a one-day course costing DM470, plus value-added tax, executives were briefed at the North Rhine-Westphalian capital's Nikko Hotel on why open plan was best.

They were all personnel managers, directors and the like, veritable captains of deskbound industry.

They were briefed by prize-winning

designers, planners and architects, a specialist in labour medicine and a representative of the Trades Union Confederation (DGB).

The TÜV was represented by Professor Karl Heinz Lindacker, its vice-chairman, and the proceedings were chaired by Günther von Lojewski, a TV linkman.

The Ministry of Labour declined to send a spokesman. It said it was not prepared to be associated with a gathering at which existing viewpoints would merely be outlined.

The Ministry's spokesman later told a *Kölnischer Stadt-Anzeiger* reporter that in his view the entire proceedings, attended by an audience of 200 or so, could not be said to have been worthy of serious attention.

Supporters of the open-plan office were certainly able to outline their ideas almost without interruption all day to others of their persuasion.

They assured each other how ideal such office designs could be and how bad and poorly-balanced the TÜV report thus was.

At the height of the proceedings works councillors from a number of leading companies took to the rostrum to say that open-plan office staff in their firms were, by and large, satisfied.

They were given a big hand by the audience.

Professor Lindacker was able on three occasions to speak up in justification of the work carried out by his colleagues. But the audience were clearly unimpressed and more interested in hearing the next critic of the survey.

More than once he asked to be given a convincing reason why there had to be any such thing as open-plan offices. None was forthcoming.

Instead, it grew clearer as the day went on why people from all over the

Continued from page 11

an affair with a shop assistant and dreams of emigrating to Canada.

Her mother is on the verge of insanity. The girl meets her first love, a boy next door who is put in a children's home. She rebels against her parents, who are always quarrelling over money, and develops an ambivalent relationship to them.

Betrayal, directed by Vibeke Lokkeberg, portrays the betrayal of a child, its youth and its feelings.

Peter Baco's *The Witness* might well also have been entitled *The Betrayal*: a betrayal of socialism. It is a satire he directed in 1968 that is only now being shown in his native Hungary.

It is hard to believe that he was ever allowed to make the film, let alone that it is on show in Hungary.

His simple, naive, trusting hero believes literally in the promises socialism makes and puts them into practice. This leads to the discovery of a nepotistic system in which a sentimental and cynical authority reminiscent of Kafka tries to oblige an all-powerful Big Brother.

The most amusing conflicts ensue, and Baco misses no opportunity of losing his bolts of satire at the system of personality cults.

Ota Josseliani's *Pastorale* shows how rural civilisation, archaism and anar-



Under the eye of the boss.

(Photo: Marienne von der Ley)

country had converged on Düsseldorf for the gathering.

Their aim was to arrive at some way or other in which to end the entire debate on whether or not open-plan offices were a good idea before office staff started getting ideas on the subject.

By the afternoon Herr von Lojewski had abandoned his impartiality. There could surely be no doubt that the report had made economic mischief, he said. It was merely a matter of how much harm had been done.

This assumption was then taken as read. If it had been discussed, maybe the other side of the coin might have been given consideration.

How much harm has been done, one could just as well ask, if the TÜV report were to be vindicated?

Instead, the conclusion reached was that open-plan offices are good and the findings of the TÜV survey bad. Quod erat demonstrandum.

All that remained was to consider how the TÜV and the Ministry of Labour were to be persuaded to think again.

The head of the health service of a Cologne motor manufacturer tried a direct approach. He asked Professor Lin-

ckacker whether, after all he had heard, he was prepared to agree that things need not be generally valid.

The professor gave a straight answer: "No."

So the gathering agreed to call on the Ministry to commission a further survey, and, if it refused to do so, to commission one itself.

At the same time it was announced with a reference to the standing of people at the conference, that a petition would be launched.

At the Ministry a further report had to be needed. Ministry of Georg Klesch says the TÜV reports contain such a wealth of data that they may readily generalise from it.

Besides, the Federal Labour Protection and Accident Research Institute had monitored the survey and given approval.

The main point made by critics is only one kind of open-plan office dealt with in the report: administrative (local government offices in Hildesheim, Cologne).

Herr Klesch says this objection is not hold water. Shortcomings such as lack of privacy and self-determination and inadequate heating and ventilation apply to all kinds of open-plan offices whether administrative or industrial.

Besides, over 95 per cent of office workers polled said they would work in conventional offices. That suggests, is surely a convincing proof.

Letters arrive daily at the Ministry from long-suffering open-plan office workers. Almost to a man they are of the view that someone has at last summed up the courage to voice criticism.

Three university professors have already written in saying they have tried out research projects in the past which similar conclusions were reached. None has claimed to have reached conclusions that ran counter to the TÜV survey.

"We are used to criticism of this kind," Herr Klesch says. "No-one is being accused of getting his plan all wrong."

He recalls an earlier survey of market cash desks in which a kind of arrangement was found to be a health hazard.

There was heated criticism of the findings too, leading to the commissioning of a second opinion from a professor. But his findings tallied with those of the initial report.

So the unsatisfactory cash desks were quietly refitted, and that was that.

Wolfram Schütte (Frankfurter Rundschau, 20 February 1982)

■ BEHAVIOUR

Anatomy of a junkie: why
people take to heroin

Cologne doctors and sociologists have interviewed about 100 heroin addicts in North Rhine-Westphalia to find out how they took to drugs.

Their published findings are said to be the most comprehensive report yet compiled on addiction.

There are about 60,000 heroin addicts in the Federal Republic of Germany; there are about 6,000 newcomers a year.

The report was compiled by Dr Herbert Berger of Marienheide Hospital, Dr Karl-Heinz Reuband of Cologne University's central empirical social research archives and Ullrich Widlitzek of the Cologne child research unit.

Young addicts were questioned in interviews lasting several hours on how they were first introduced to drugs and came to take heroin.

The authors say the report is not only the most comprehensive yet; it is also claimed to be the first-ever empirical survey of heroin addiction in North Rhine-Westphalia.

Four out of five young addicts interviewed were aged between 18 and 22. Their social and economic backgrounds were fairly average, with all rungs of the social ladder represented.

Heroin addicts came from all walks of life and only half the interviewees were children of working-class parents, but that was still a higher proportion than among users of soft drugs.

Roughly half came from broken homes. Parents were either divorced or separated, or one or the other had died.

Even if both parents were around, family life had tended to be turbulent. The juvenile had nothing to do with parental problems and kept his own to himself.

Ties with parents tended to be weak because they were felt not to understand their children properly. A relationship of trust existed, if at all, with the mother.

Fathers paid little or no attention to the children's upbringing. There were no emotional climaxes. The family got along with each other, but that was about all. It was strictly a relationship of convenience.

Addicts did not get far at school. Most went to the least demanding category of secondary school and left at the earliest opportunity; only one in four went to grammar school or college.

Most had felt school to be not much fun. After school they usually served a craft apprenticeship, but only about 40 per cent qualified as journeymen.

So only about one in four had career qualifications. Apprenticeships were often abandoned because of addiction problems, while many gave up the trade

learned as soon as they came into contact with their first soft drugs.

Yet they were not outsiders or outcasts before they took to heroin. About 60 per cent said they had had no difficulty in making contact with others.

Six out of 10 said that as children and in their early teens they had been on equal terms with their friends. Twenty-eight per cent even claimed to have been particularly influential or leaders of the pack.

Most addicts interviewed were hooked on soft drugs at school or during their apprenticeship. Thirty-seven per cent had experimented with narcotics by the time they were fourteen.

Well over three quarters began with hash, but it would be wrong to blame cannabis as the road to hell; only about five per cent of hash users ever go on to try heroin.

But to start with cannabis in the first place, the experts write, you need not only be willing to try but also to have an opportunity of doing so.

In many respects drug-taking is a result of everyday situations. All kids sooner or later come across others who

take drugs. They are more likely to show interest if they are friends or people they know.

So in view of the crucial role played by friends and acquaintances it is not the loners but the gregarious youngsters who run the gravest risk of drug addiction, it would seem.

Trouble at home, at school or with friends seldom seems to have had any effect in deciding youngsters to experiment with drugs.

None of the mainliners in custody said they had been heavily persuaded or pressurised in any way to try narcotics the first time.

As soft drug-takers they automatically got to know their first heroin addicts. Initially they may have viewed them with misgivings, feeling alarmed at the prospect of addiction.

But these fears were dispelled as soon as they made the acquaintance of other junkies whose way of life they admired and who did not seem to measure up to the accepted clichés about drug addicts.

Even when they are abjectly reliant on heroin, addicts make a point of appearing cool, calm and self-assured.

Children able to
mimic with
discrimination

cause it needs to wear them for going out.

Professor Michaelis' theory is borne out by the findings of Horst Zunkley, a Saarbrücken University psychologist. Dr Zunkley says children at play are more likely to imitate aggressive behaviour if they have been playing keenly and with enjoyment.

This observation, he concedes, does not allow of a conclusive inference as to the part played by the mimic child's actual motivation.

So he has carried out an experiment with 58 children from various kindergartens in the Saar, showing them a film in which two models starred with a big plastic doll, first in an aggressive manner, then in a non-aggressive one.

In the first scene the model hammered away at the doll with a plastic hammer, in the second he danced with the doll in his arms, stepping over the hammer, which lay on the ground.

Before the film was shown Dr Zunkley tried to influence the children's motives. He spent half an hour with one group on a task that required powers of concentration, the idea being to make them feel like playing instead.

The other group spent half an hour at play to make them feel less in need of diversion, while a third was told it was a test and they must try very hard to concentrate.

The idea of the test, he said, was to find out how much progress they had made at kindergarten and whether they were old enough to go to school, so would they please pay attention and do their best?

Once the film had been run the children were told there would be a short interval, so they were free to do what they wanted for a while.

Sooner or later the potential addict sees how a friend feels great under the influence. Seventy-nine per cent said curiosity about how it felt to be high had prompted them to try it and see.

On average it takes youngsters two years to progress from soft drugs to their first heroin. From then to addiction it is a matter of only weeks or months.

Eight out of 10 first-timers feel their first shot to be enjoyable and repeat the experiment within a matter of hours.

Before long their life centres on the drug. Life seems to consist of getting hold of heroin and taking it. Drug-peddling and small-time crime foot the bill.

Many addicts claim a short life and a merry one is best. Drugs are invariably considered more important than sex, although good-looking addicts often have girlfriends or boyfriends as a status symbol.

By and large, addicts feel addiction has enhanced their reputation among their friends and acquaintances. But all are also convinced the scene has lost much of its erstwhile attraction for them.

So it is hardly surprising to learn that three out of four have tried at some stage or other to drop the habit by themselves; they seldom succeed.

deutscher Forschungsdienst

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 23 February 1982)

They were taken into a room full of toys, including a plastic doll and a hammer. They spent 10 minutes in this room and their behaviour was closely observed, but by staff who had not been told what the object of the exercise was.

The various motives were found to have a distinct effect on the children's post-film behaviour while under observation.

The group that had been motivated to play and the group that had been motivated to do its best seemed much more inclined to imitate what they had seen than the third group.

Oddly enough, the children that had been told to pay attention and try hard showed less interest in aggressive behaviour than the group that had been encouraged to take a play break.

Maybe that was because they felt they were expected to be good, especially as grown-ups were interested in whether or not they were ready to go to school.

After the play break the children were then asked what they had been doing and why. The group that had been concentrating beforehand said for the most part that they had been playing after the film.

The group that had been told their suitability for attending school was to be tested mostly claimed they had been keen to show what they could do.

This shows, Dr Zunkley says, not only that what the instructor said definitely affected how the children behaved.

It also shows, he writes in the *Zeitschrift für Entwicklungspsychologie und Pädagogische Psychologie*, that there can be altogether different intentions behind identical behaviour, depending on motivation.

Interviews with the kindergarten children showed that the model's behaviour was interpreted in different ways: Depending how they themselves were motivated, they took the behaviour of the film figure to suggest either play or achievement.

Winfried Berner (Kölnischer Anzeiger, 19 February 1982)

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